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How cautious should regulators be? To those concerned with the ethics of 
environmental regulation, this is a central question. The answer bears 
directly on whether businesses and institutions should be allowed to risk 
harming people or the natural environment: on whether we allow the use 
of hydraulic fracturing to access shale gas; or the building of nuclear power 
plants; or the discharge of pollutants into the environment; or experiments 
in geoengineering. If we should be very cautious, then it may well turn out 
that such risky activities ought to be banned; if the appropriate level of 
care is lower, then it may well turn out that they should be permitted. And, 
if we determine that running such risks is permissible, the answer to our 
initial question will also bear on how these practices should be regulated: 
on what precautions, or safety features, or limits we require the risk-
imposers to institute. The more cautious we should be, the more tightly we 
should regulate the risky activities we allow. 
Given how central our question is, it is no surprise that answers to it are 
implicit in existing regulatory procedures. Take, for instance, the approach 
to regulation mandated in US President Reagan’s Executive Order (and 
re-affirmed in Executive Orders issued by US Presidents Clinton1 and 
Obama2). For federal regulatory agencies in the US, “regulatory objectives 
shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society; and “among 
alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative 
involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen.” 3  The US 
government’s answer to our opening question here is clear: we should be 
as cautious as is necessary to produce the most good possible. Any less 
cautious than this, and we will have failed to prevent some bad things from 
happening; any more cautious than this, and we will have restricted 
people’s freedom in ways that make things worse overall. 
Of course, agencies typically do not know ahead of time exactly what the 
costs and benefits of regulations will be, and hence can’t know what 
regulations would produce the best results. Consequently, instead of being 
held to the standard of choosing what will actually be maximally beneficial, 
we should understand the point of the orders as requiring that regulators 
to choose based on what they predict will maximize value given what is 
known. Indeed, this is how the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs has interpreted the Orders: “To value changes in risk arising from 
variability in expected outcomes as a consequence of regulation, agencies 
                                                
1 Executive Order 12866, 58 FR 51735, September 30, 1993. 
2 Executive Order 13562, 76 FR 3821, January 18, 2011. 
3 Executive Order 12291, 46 FR 13193, February 17, 1981, §2(c) and (d). 
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should consider the expected net benefits of the risk change, taking into 
account the probability distribution of potential outcomes with and 
without the regulation.”4 
It will come as no surprise that the U.S. government’s answer to how 
cautious regulators should be is controversial. Defenders of the 
Precautionary Principle, in particular, take themselves to reject it. What do 
they propose instead? Despite the fact that the Precautionary Principle is 
appealed to in laws, treaties and even constitutions, there is no 
straightforward answer to that question. But we can confidently say this 
much: whereas the U.S. government says we should be just cautious 
enough to maximize expected value, defenders of the precautionary 
principle say we should be more cautious than that. As the prominent 
Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle puts it, “We believe 
existing environmental regulations and other decisions, particularly those 
based on risk assessment, have failed to protect adequately human health 
and the environment.”5 
This is hardly a satisfying answer to our opening question, though, for it 
says nothing about what level of care is required beyond that which 
maximizes expected value. One way to zero in on a more precise answer 
would to be analyze specific cases in which regulating for maximum 
expected value seems to be inadequately cautious, and then try extract 
more general lessons from them. An alternative strategy would be to start 
by thinking about the ethics of doing what those who are candidates for 
regulation want to do: namely, impose risks of harm on others in the 
pursuit of some kind of benefit. We could then use the moral analysis of 
risk imposition to motivate particular levels and kinds of governmental 
constraints on risky activity.  
In the remainder of this paper, I will pursue the second, more theoretically 
driven strategy. In particular, I will detail some of the resources a 
particular strand of nonconsequentialist normative ethics – contractualism 
– can provide to defenders of the Precautionary Principle, and then think 
through what they imply regarding how cautious regulators should be. 
Some will be less than sanguine about the prospects of this strategy. In a 
recent and incisive article, Barbara Fried has argued that “the effort to 
come up with nonaggregative principles to handle the problem of risk 
must fail — … the problem of risk, by its nature, can be managed only 
with the sorts of interpersonal trade-offs that the contractualist enterprise is 
foundationally committed to rejecting.” 6  It goes without saying that, 
despite some real challenges she raises for contractualists, I think that she is 
                                                
4  Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (1996), §III(A)4(d), 
emphasis added. 
5 Available at http://www.sehn.org/wing.html 
6 Fried (2012), p. 40. 
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mistaken. More particularly, I will argue that she has overlooked the 
promise of contractualism in a particular range of cases: namely, those in 
which we can identify those who can be expected to lose from a risk 
imposition. In these important cases, contractualism offers a compelling 
non-aggregative and more precautionary alternative to regulating for 
maximum expected benefit. But before showing how this is so, it will be 
helpful to think through contractualist approaches to the regulation of risk 
more generally. 
At the heart of contractualist theories is the idea that our actions are 
permissible only if we can justify them to those people whom our choices 
affect.  If someone we affect does not have sufficient reason to consent, if 
we cannot give her a justification for our action that is acceptable from her 
point of view, then we have not taken her into account in our actions in 
the way that her moral status demands.7  
There are, to be sure, variations on this core idea. Different theorists have 
different accounts of precisely what kind of consent is necessary to render 
actions permissible, and correspondingly different accounts of what kind of 
justifications a person should accept for the purposes of legitimating 
another’s action. To the extent possible, I will be glossing over many of 
these differences. But all of the theories I will be drawing on share the 
following feature: they will allow that personal reasons can be sufficient 
grounds for reasonably rejecting some kind of treatment. That is, in at 
least some cases, the fact that something would be bad for a person will 
allow them to reasonably reject it, even if it would be better for the world 
overall if the action were performed. This is a feature that most 
contractualist theories share, and for good reason. Insisting that something 
other than overall value matters morally is essential to 
nonconsequentialism. Contractualism of the sort that I will be working 
with takes that thing to be how burdensome things are from the 
individual’s point of view.  
Consider, for instance, the standard (for philosophers) case in which killing 
one innocent person will produce resources necessary for saving several 
others from death and thereby produce a better outcome overall. Some 
consequentialists will be committed to saying that morality requires the 
killing, while most other people think morality forbids it. Contractualists 
justify the more commonsensical response by appealing to the fact that the 
potential victim could reasonably object to being killed for the sake of 
several strangers. From her perspective, in which her interests are 
particularly important, her death is too steep a price to pay. And since she 
can reasonably refuse to be used in this way, the contractualist will say, 
killing her is morally forbidden. 
                                                
7 The contemporary locus classicus is Scanlon (1998). 
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Given the appeal of this way of handling questions of harming some in 
order to benefit others, it would be tempting for contractualists to apply 
parallel reasoning in the standard regulatory issue of whether it is 
permissible for some to impose a risk of harm on others.  Consider the 
following schematic case: a regulatory agency’s risk analysis reveals that 
allowing businesses to pollute at a certain level will impose a 1:500,000 risk 
of contracting fatal cancer on 1,000,000 people, and that their cost-benefit 
analysis reveals that when the benefits of the industrial activity and the 
costs of reducing the pollution even further are taken into account, setting 
the regulatory ceiling at this level will maximize expected utility. 
Contractualists will ask whether it will be possible to justify this risk 
imposition to everyone. Initially, it seems that we cannot. The agency 
predicts that their regulation will permit business to do what will kill two 
people for the sake of providing benefits to others. And, as before, each of 
these people could reasonably object to being given cancer: from their 
perspective, their contracting fatal cancer is just too high a price to pay in 
order to secure the benefits of the industrial activity for others. The fact 
that what the businesses will do under this regulation would therefore be 
morally impermissible could then be used to ground an objection to the 
proposed regulation as insufficiently cautious. 
This nonconsequentialist approach to the regulation of activities that 
impose a risk of serious harm certainly would count as an alternative to the 
Executive Order mandates. The trouble is that it has totally implausible 
implications. According to the analysis, a person whose life has been put at 
risk can reasonably reject the imposition, and this renders the risky activity 
wrongful. But nearly everything we do – from buying a cup of coffee in the 
morning to going to sleep at night – imposes a risk of death on others. 
There is a tiny chance that driving to the café will cause a fatal car crash; 
there is an even tinier chance that going to sleep will make us miss a phone 
call that causes a telemarketer to go home early and be struck by lightning 
on the way. The nonconsequentialist analysis above thus implies that 
nearly everything we do wrongfully imposes a risk of serious harm to 
others and hence that governmental agencies should not grant people the 
freedom to do anything. That would be taking precaution too far, to say 
the least.  
One consequence of this failure is that whatever the Precautionary 
Principle’s more precise answer to ‘How cautious should regulators be?’ is, 
it cannot be that governments should prohibit any activity that imposes a 
risk of serious harm on others.8 More importantly, we now have to find 
                                                
8 Sunstein (2003) takes this to be a damning objection to the Precautionary 
Principle. And given that the Wingspread version of the principle reads 
‘When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken…’ his charge has 
some initial credibility. 
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some other way of motivating an alternative to expected value 
maximization within contractualism. Asking whether those who are killed 
by a risky activity could reasonably consent to the activity given the 
outcome will not work. 
The trouble with our first attempt was that a person’s premature death will 
nearly always provide her with sufficient personal reasons to refuse to 
agree to an action that causes it. So if we are to find a contractualist 
analysis of risk imposition that doesn’t condemn every choice we make, we 
need some way of excluding a victim’s eventual death from the 
considerations that bear on her consent to running a risk that causes it. 
This may sound implausible, but there is one promising strategy. The key 
is to remember that, in most cases, whether there will be a victim – and if 
so, who the victim will be – can’t be determined in advance. At the time 
the risk is run, any eventual victims will not have access to the fact that 
they will be killed. And so there is an important sense in which this fact is 
not available as a reason to inform their consent. 
Put another way, the trouble with the initial proposal was that we were 
asking whether those affected could consent to a risk after its outcome for 
them had occurred and hence was known. But a contractualist could 
remind us that the central question of regulatory caution concerns what is 
permissible when we do not know in detail what the results of regulations 
will be, so asking what people could reasonably object to under this 
condition of uncertainty seems appropriate. The consent that is required is 
that which could be obtained at the time the risk is run, given the reasons 
that were available then. Since these reasons will be in terms of forecasts of 
the results of a choice rather than its actual results, what we would now be 
looking for is ex ante consent.9 
Changing to ex ante consent can solve some problems of extreme over-
regulation. If we want to know whether people would consent ex ante to 
the risks involved with allowing everyone in a household to go to sleep at 
the same time, the answer is easy. From each of our perspectives, the 
benefits of the freedom to go to sleep when we please will vastly outweigh 
the tiny chance that allowing everyone to do so will result in our death. 
Consequently, it would be unreasonable for any of us to object to people 
having this freedom. So far, so good. But now consider how shifting to ex 
ante consent changes the contractualist’s analysis of our hypothetical 
imposition of a 1:500,000 risk of contracting fatal cancer on 1,000,000 
people. Let us assume that all of the million people are situated similarly 
regarding the risk, and that a reliable cost-benefit analysis would show that 
allowing the pollution has a higher expected net benefit for them than 
                                                
9 This would constitute a break with Scanlon (1998), as he there frames 
contractualism exclusively in terms of the ex post perspective. Recently, 
though, he has allowed that this might have been a mistake. See Scanlon 
(2013), p. 510. 
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prohibiting it does. With this information in hand, it is difficult to see how 
any individual could reasonably refuse the imposition of the risk. The 
chances of getting cancer are extremely remote, and the benefits they can 
expect from running the risk, we are assuming, are substantial and far 
more likely to occur. To reject such a risk means preferring what one 
expects will make one’s own life – and the world overall – worse. And if 
everyone, so far as they are being reasonable, will accept that the benefits 
to them justify the tiny additional cancer risk, then a regulation that 
permits this level of pollution will be permissible on contractualist grounds.  
The trouble here is not that this is clearly the wrong answer; instead, it is 
that by embracing ex ante consent as the test of permissibility, the 
contractualist has lost the grounds for objecting to maximum expected 
value as the criterion of legitimate regulation, at least in this case. The 
question for advocates of the Precautionary Principle, then, is whether 
there is something special about the example, whether there are features 
peculiar to it that generate the agreement between ex ante contractualism 
and consequentialism.  
I think there are. A crucial assumption in this case was that all the people 
were situated similarly vis-à-vis both the risks and the benefits. As a result, 
not only was the expected value of the result of the permissive regulation 
best overall, it was best for each of those who would be affected by it. But 
contractualism’s motivating concern is explaining the moral objection to 
harming some for the benefit of others. When everyone is an expected 
winner, as in the above case, contractualism’s core concern isn’t at issue, 
and so it is no surprise that it agrees with the consequentialist result. But 
risks are often not like that. Instead, many risky activities have likely 
winners and likely losers. And it is here that contractualism is likely to have 
its distinctive purchase.  
Consider current debates over whether and how to allow hydraulic 
fracturing of shale gas deposits. I suspect that if fracking were to be 
permitted and regulated under the Executive Order approach, I would fall 
into the likely loser category: I wouldn’t sell gas companies drilling rights 
to my land (and, in any event, my property is too small for them to want to 
pay) and I would be exposed to risks to my health and prosperity. Of 
course, allowing gas drilling could still maximize expected value overall: 
the net benefit to the winners might swamp the net cost to us losers. 
Suppose it does. And suppose that I am right in thinking that it is likely 
that allowing fracking in my area would be worse for me than prohibiting 
it. It appears now that, even when we switch to ex ante consent, not 
everyone has sufficient reason to consent to fracking. I, in particular, can 
reasonably reject the drilling of wells in my area because doing so could be 
expected to make my life considerably worse. If so, then the gas companies’ 
drilling would wrong me, and this could serve as a ground for objecting to 
a regulation that would permit it. Generalizing, the contractualist 
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conclusion would be this: governments must regulate so that risky activities 
are carried out only in ways whose expected value is not negative for 
anyone. 
There are, of course, more compelling examples of people for whom some 
particular industrial activity has negative expected value. The 
environmental justice literature is rife with cases in which environmental 
hazards have been visited upon people who stand to gain very little from 
them. Because they are poor and/or lack political power, historically 
underprivileged groups are often exposed to risks, the benefits of which go 
to others. I don’t mean to diminish the importance of these cases, and the 
contractualist account being explored here does indeed explain at least 
part of the wrongness they involve. But it is important to note that the 
contractualist analysis is not confined to such cases either. Just as it can be 
wrong to steal or assault the wealthy and powerful, it can be wrong to 
impose environmental risks on them as well.  
At this point, however, we may begin to worry that the move to ex ante 
consent has not solved the problem it was initially meant to solve. For it is 
hard to imagine a kind of industrial activity whose expected benefits won’t 
be negative for someone. But prohibiting all industrial activity would, once 
again, be to take precaution too far.  
In particular, it would take precaution too far even for me, in the sense 
that generalizing my veto of fracking would yield a regulatory criterion 
that would imply that we should ban energy extraction altogether, and this 
would have negative expected value from my perspective. I’d likely be 
better off with fracking if the alternative were no large-scale energy-
extraction projects at all. We might try to use this fact as a basis for 
revising the contractualist approach to assess whole systems of regulation, 
rather than individual regulations piecemeal. Although he doesn’t 
motivate it within a contractualist framework, this is the strategy embraced 
by Sven Ove Hansson. In response to the problem of extreme prohibition 
when risk imposition is viewed on a case-by-case basis, he suggests that we 
should look at ‘social practices of risk-taking.’ More specifically he 
proposes the following criterion: 
“Exposure of a person to a risk is acceptable,” he suggests, “if (i) this 
exposure is part of a persistently justice-seeking social practice of risk-
taking that works to her advantage and which she accepts by making use 
of its advantages, and (ii) she has as much influence over her risk-exposure 
as every similarly risk-exposed person can have without loss of the social 
benefits that justify the risk-exposure.”10 
                                                
10 Hansson (2013), p. 108. Fletcher (1972) is the pioneering work for the 
normative implications of mutually beneficial systems of risk imposition.  
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Given its complexity, it is no surprise that there are many questions that 
need to be resolved before we can really assess this criterion. For instance, 
what is it for a practice to be ‘sufficiently justice-seeking’? How much of a 
concern for justice, on the part of whom, expressed in what ways, is 
sufficient? Hansson doesn’t say. And how are we to specify ‘justice’ in a 
way that doesn’t render the criterion uninformative? Since in asking when 
a risk-imposition is acceptable, Hansson takes himself to be asking when a 
right to be free from risk imposition is defeated, the criterion seems meant 
to specify when imposing a risk does not constitute doing something unjust. 
And saying that a risk imposition is not unjust when and only when it is 
part of a system that is striving to not impose risks unjustly does not take us 
very far. 
Our main concern here, however, is the shift in focus to ‘social practices.’ 
One challenge facing such an account is to specify the scope of such 
practices. Hansson considers and rejects several alternatives before settling 
on his preferred interpretation. The first he considers is very narrow: 
evaluating the practice of being exposed to specific risks. This, he thinks, 
will not solve the problem at hand. His example concerns focusing on 
specific chemical pollutants. If we assessed risk-impositions at this level of 
detail, he says, we would have to prohibit too much. There are likely 
chemicals that are released in the production of only certain products, and 
some people who will be exposed to them will have no interest in using 
those products and hence will not benefit from their production. For these 
people, the expected value of producing these products will be negative. 
But if we prohibited all such pollution, industry would be paralyzed. “In 
order to reap the advantages of modern society,’ he says, “… we also need 
to engage in exchanges of different kinds of risks and benefits.” 
This suggests that our focus should be on the entire system of risk-
imposition, which is to say, nearly all of our interactions with others. The 
trouble here, as he notes, is that such a wide scope yields a criterion that is 
not practicable. A regulatory agency, for instance, has no control over –  
and no resources to monitor – the many kinds of risky activity that lie 
beyond its jurisdiction, yet it would have to take all these activities into 
account in determining what regulations were permissible. Determining 
whether regulators in New York should lift the current moratorium on 
fracking would require taking into account the aviation risks and benefits 
experienced by Californians. This would render responsible regulation 
practically impossible. 
Hansson’s solution is to say that the relevant unit of evaluation is ‘social 
sectors,’ such as transportation, industrial production and healthcare. If 
the expected value of the transportation system as a whole is positive for 
everyone, for instance, then the risks imposed on others by those who 
operate according to its rules are permissible.  
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Some will surely wonder what motivates this level of analysis. Why the 
entire transportation system, rather than road transport more specifically? 
Why transportation alone rather than transportation and storage? These 
questions can wait, though, because taking sectors as the unit of evaluation 
does not really solve the contractualist’s problem of being overly restrictive 
when it comes to risk. While the risky activities of many sectors of modern 
industrial society have an expected net benefit for most of us, this is not 
true for all of us. One prominent example in the contractualist literature is 
the Amish.11 They are exposed to risks by passenger vehicular traffic, for 
instance, but the expected benefit of the modern transportation system is 
likely to be negative for them, opposed as they are to using it. Their 
situation is parallel to those who have no interest in using specific products. 
Since Hansson took the expected disvalue for some of making a product to 
rule out its manufacture if we were to assess risk-by-risk, it seems he must 
say that the expected disvalue to the Amish is enough to render the risks 
imposed by modern transport impermissible. Once again, this seems too 
restrictive: contractualists don’t want a criterion of permissible risk 
imposition that would require us all to travel by horse and buggy.  
By this point, the hopes of providing a compelling alternative to the 
regulatory pursuit of maximum expected benefit can seem dim. If 
contractualist regulators were to adopt the ex post perspective, it seems 
they must prohibit all conduct that creates a risk of serious harm, but this 
would paralyze society. This is not compelling. If instead they adopt the ex 
ante perspective, and are faced with a risk that would be shared equally by 
all, they will recommend exactly the same regulations as recommended by 
the expected utility maximizers. This is not an alternative to maximization. 
And when they are faced with risks with identifiable expected winners and 
losers, it seems that they must prohibit the risky conduct, since the 
expected losers can reasonably reject the risk imposition. But the existence 
of people like the Amish seems to guarantee that there will be expected 
losers of much of modern technology. And again, prohibiting most 
technological advance is not compelling. Fried’s pessimism regarding 
contractualism is on the cusp of being vindicated.  
But there is an option for contractualists that has been overlooked. 
Contractualists can point out that when a socially beneficial activity has 
expected net disvalue for some, prohibiting it is not the only way to protect 
these people from being wronged. Instead, we could require that those 
who engage in such useful but risky activities take greater responsibility for 
the distribution of its benefits and burdens. In particular, we could insist 
that, as a precondition of engaging in the activity, they take steps to insure 
that its expected value is not actually negative for anyone. Transposed into 
the language of economists, acceptable risks must be (expected to be) strict 
Pareto improvements. 
                                                
11  
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Consider again the case of hydraulic fracturing. Suppose that I am correct 
in speculating that fracking in accordance with the regulations 
recommended by the Executive Order approach will have negative 
expected value for some. Rather than banning it all together, regulators 
could respond to this fact by issuing rules that compel gas companies to 
operate in ways that change the distribution of costs and benefits so that 
no person could reasonably expect to be harmed by their activities.  
How might they do this? The first step would have to be diagnostic. 
Rather than simply performing global risk assessments and cost-benefit 
analyses in order to determine aggregate expected value, regulators would 
have to focus on those who have the least to gain and the most to lose.   Of 
course, the more publicly accessible the regulatory process is, the easier it 
will be to find those who fall into this category. With wide dissemination of 
information concerning the risks and rewards, and an open public 
comment period, those who are most vulnerable and/or their advocates 
are likely to self-identify.12 A targeted cost-benefit analysis for them could 
then be used to reveal what and how much needs to be done to insure that 
the expected value of fracking is not negative for them, and hence that 
they could reasonably consent to being exposed to the risks that gas 
drilling would involve.  
More specifically, since the expected value of the activity for each is a 
function of the costs and benefits for her, there are two paths regulators 
can pursue to the goal of universal reasonable consent: they can issue 
regulations that reduce the expected costs for those who are most 
vulnerable; and they can issue regulations that increase these people’s 
expected benefit. Let’s take these two strategies in order. Reducing 
expected costs will often mean putting extra safety measures in place so 
that the chances of a bad outcome are reduced. And if this is to be at all 
successful in improving the expected value for those who would be among 
the losers if we were to follow the Executive Order approach, these safety 
measures would have to go beyond what would be warranted if we were 
allowing the benefits to the winners to offset the costs to the losers.  
Take, for instance, the standards for gas well construction. There is a 
tradeoff between how unlikely a well casing is to leak pollutants into the 
water table and how expensive it is to build. The benefit of lower 
construction expense comes at the cost of higher chance of failure. When 
those who follow the Executive Order approach analyze casing standards, 
they try to optimize the balance of the total benefits and costs. Avoiding 
                                                
12 We thus have a contractualist justification of one of the central tenets of 
the Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle: “The process 
of applying the Precautionary Principle must be open, informed and 
democratic and must include potentially affected parties.” 
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great expense can be a reason for taking fewer precautions than we might. 
But when we switch to the contractualist approach of finding regulations 
that insure everyone no person can expect to be harmed, it is not the 
balance of the total costs and benefits that matters, but the balance for 
each person individually. As a result, the benefits that will go to companies, 
their investors and their consumers of lower well construction prices will 
not enter into the equation of the optimal level of well safety from the 
perspective of the most vulnerable. Since the most vulnerable will typically 
not receive these benefits, these benefits cannot offset the increased risk 
from looser standards. The level of safety that would be needed in order to 
warrant the consent of the most vulnerable is thus likely to be higher than 
that needed in order to produce a net benefit overall.  
This contractualist result dovetails with the intuition of many 
Precautionary Principle advocates that the Executive Order approach is 
insufficiently cautious. We thus have succeeded in giving a contractualist 
justification of one of their core commitments. The second path to 
legitimate of risk imposition that contractualism gives regulators – namely, 
regulating in ways that increase the expected benefits to the vulnerable – is 
less familiar. Given the analysis so far, though, it is no less warranted. And 
for theoretical purposes it is crucial. While increased safety may be 
sufficient to make me an expected winner from fracking, we still have the 
problem of the Amish. Passenger air travel, for instance, exposes them to a 
risk of death (from falling planes), but they stand to gain nothing at all 
from it. It is impossible for regulators to issue safety regulations that would 
eliminate the risk of plane crashes altogether. So, if increased safety were 
the only tool available to regulators, passenger air travel would have to 
have negative expected value for the Amish: they will gain nothing, and 
stand some chance of being harmed. The contractualist regulator, it seems, 
would still be committed to prohibiting passenger air travel altogether.13 
The problem vanishes, though, once we recognize that the regulators can 
do more than mandate safety measures. They can also create rules that 
shift benefits of the activity to those who would otherwise be expected to 
lose. This means that prohibiting a risky activity is not the only way to 
                                                
13 This is Elizabeth Ashford’s conclusion. In her words, “for many … 
activities, not all of those who face the remote risk of being killed by the 
activity could have expected to benefit from it. Forgoing all activities of 
[this] kind could significantly impoverish agents’ lives. However, as long as 
their lives would still be well worth living, then the cost to each of them of 
the extensive burden of avoiding the risk would be less than the cost to 
another individual of actually being killed by the activity. Therefore, 
measures which reduced the extremely remote risk of death to a few 
individuals would be justified even if they severely impoverished the lives 
of millions.” Ashford (2003), 299-300. The problem is also discussed in 
Lenman (2008) and Fried (2012). 
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protect those for whom – no matter how many safeguards are mandated – 
it will still have expected disvalue. Instead, regulators can require, as a 
condition of engaging in risky activity, that the risk-imposers redirect some 
of the benefits to these people so that they would not expected to lose 
overall. And while this will require them to do more for those who are 
exposed to risks than the Executive Order approach would, this need not 
be unduly burdensome.  
The basic idea of increasing the expected benefits of an activity for the 
expected losers of socially beneficial activities is straightforward: the 
expected winners must provide some benefit to the expected losers that 
outweighs the risks they will be subject to. Exactly what this will entail in 
any given case will depend on the particulars, but it is hard to imagine a 
case in which it won’t be possible. Even in the case of the Amish – who, 
after all, could benefit from lower tax rates, increased access to medical 
care, or more support for their schools – it is not difficult to imagine how 
taxes on air travel could be used in ways that offset the tiny expected cost 
to them of our allowing others to fly in planes. And once they are among 
the expected winners of air travel, they no longer present an obstacle to its 
permissibility from the contractualist perspective. Once contractualists 
shift to the ex ante perspective and recognize that shifting some of the 
benefits of a risky activity allows us to change its expected value for 
individuals, what has been considered a serious theoretical problem for 
contractualists is eminently solvable.  
Translating this theoretical point into the regulatory context: in addition to 
requiring safeguards that go beyond what would be justified on a cost-
benefit basis, contractualist regulators can require that some portion of the 
benefits of a proposed risky activity be shifted towards those who would 
otherwise be expected to be harmed by it. It is worth noting the variety of 
ways this might be accomplished. One way is the way we just handled the 
problem of Amish and air travel: redirect some of the profits to all who are 
expected losers under the Executive Order approach at the time that the 
risks are imposed on them. In our hydraulic fracturing example, this might 
involve direct cash payments from the gas companies to the members of 
the communities in which the fracking is to occur. Or, less directly, it 
might involve contributions to public institutions that benefit those people. 
In this case, all those who stand to lose otherwise receive additional 
benefits to offset the additional risks they run.14 
Alternatively, regulators could take steps at the time the risks are run to 
guarantee that any of those among the vulnerable who are later made 
worse off by the activity receive benefits that at least partly offset those 
losses.15 The prospect of receiving such benefits if worst comes to worst 
                                                
14 Some merits of such a system are discussed in Lin (2005) 
15 In the rare cases in which people who stand to gain nothing at all from 
an activity are exposed to risks of near instantaneous death, benefits 
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can increase the expected value of the activity for a person beforehand. 
Tort law is one standard mechanism for directing benefits to those who are 
harmed by a risky activity: when victims successfully sue for damages, the 
risk-imposer is compelled to give some of the benefits that they reaped to 
those who were harmed. But for the purposes of shifting benefits to the 
vulnerable from the ex ante perspective, tort law has its weaknesses. One 
major weakness is that in many jurisdictions, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the risk-imposer was at fault in order to merit payment, usually by 
showing that the risk was imposed negligently. The problem with such 
fault-based tort systems in the current context is that many of the possible 
harms that can make the expected value of an activity negative for some 
can arise without any negligence at all. In the fracking case, for instance, 
many are concerned with pollution that might be produced even if gas 
companies comply with whatever regulations are in place. Since risk-
imposers wouldn’t be liable for such pollution in a fault-based system, the 
existence of such a tort system wouldn’t help offset the expected disvalue of 
the harms it could cause.  
One response to this limitation would be for regulators to stipulate that 
risk-imposers will be liable for harms associated with their activity whether 
or not they were negligent, essentially holding them to what legal scholars 
call a ‘strict’ liability standard. Thus even if a gas company were to follow 
all the safety practices mandated by regulation, they would still be required 
to pay for the damages their fracking caused.16 Under such a regime, the 
payments owed victims would not necessarily be compensation for wrong-
doing. Instead they would often be like the compensation property owners 
receive when tenants non-negligently damage their property and the 
property owner withholds some of the tenants’ security deposit.  
The ex ante institution of strict liability would clearly do more than a fault-
based system to shift the expected benefits of risky activities in favor of the 
most vulnerable. But there are still concerns. One is that victims will only 
collect their payments if the risk-imposer still exists and has sufficient 
resources to pay them. The more risky the activity, however, the more 
likely it is that the imposer won’t be capable of paying. Riskier activities 
are more likely to create harms, and the more harms are created, the more 
likely it is that a firm’s liability will outrun its financial resources. Moreover, 
businesses have sometimes strategically ‘spun-off’ those parts of themselves 
that can be held liable so as to reduce their overall exposure, thus again 
making it more likely that victims will be unable to actually get the damage 
                                                                                                                                            
delivered after the loss is suffered will not be able to make the expected 
value positive, for obvious reasons. There direct ex ante transfers may be 
necessary to legitimize the risk imposition.  
16  Reeves (2104) gives a broadly Rawlsian argument for holding 
companies strictly liable for harms generated by especially risky activities, 
even retroactively. 
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awards that they are entitled to.17 All of this serves to limit the expected 
benefits such a strict-liability scheme can provide.  
One way to mitigate the chances of this kind of default – and thereby 
increase the expected benefits for the vulnerable – would be for regulators 
to require risk-imposers to contribute in advance to a fund for future 
victims in proportion to the amount of risk they impose. For instance, 
those who regulate hydraulic fracturing could establish a trust from such 
contributions that would be responsible for compensating those who are 
harmed by non-negligent well-drilling as well as those victims of negligent 
drilling who were unable to get compensated through a fault-based tort 
suit. In essence, this would function as an insurance program for the 
vulnerable with the premiums paid for by the risk-imposers.18  
Exactly how much expected benefit this insurance will provide will be a 
function of how big the fund is: the smaller the fund, the greater the 
chances are that the legitimate claims will exceed the available resources. 
Regulators could, of course, address this problem by increasing the size of 
the fund so that it would have the resources to compensate victims even if 
the worst-case scenario were to materialize. This could raise the worry that 
that requiring companies to pay such high premiums would render certain 
socially desirable risky activities financially unfeasible. But there may be 
ways around even this potential problem. Regulators could, for instance, 
collect the premiums in the form of requiring companies to buy bonds 
whose purchase price would total the expected damages under a worst-
case scenario. The value of the bonds at the time of redemption would be 
their purchase price minus the amount that had actually been paid out to 
victims plus interest. Companies would then be free to sell these bonds on 
an open market. This would mean that the regulators would have all the 
money on hand were the worst-case scenario to arise, but would refund 
any unused funds to the bond-holders when the bonds came due. Since 
the bonds would have some value on the market, however, companies’ net 
out-of-pocket expenses would be significantly less than if they were to 
receive nothing in exchange for their contributions to the compensation 
fund.19  
Surely creative regulators could devise even more instruments for shifting 
some of the benefits from the risk-imposers to those who would be 
expected to lose under regulatory schemes justified by expected value 
maximization. My point here has simply been to show that there is a 
relatively wide variety of strategies available. This is important because is 
shows that settling on the precautionary regulation contractualists would 
                                                
17 Strand (1983) and Lin (2005) lay out further barriers to recouping 
damages for environmental injury in ex post tort systems. 
18 New Zealand has instituted just such a scheme as an alternative to tort 
law for accidental harms. 
19 This alternative is inspired by Tideman and Plassmann (2010).  
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recommend in any particular case will be a complicated affair. The overall 
standard is straightforward: governments should be cautious enough to 
insure that risky activity is conducted only in ways whose expected value 
for each of us is not negative. But how to achieve this result in practice will 
be a matter of deciding on what suite of safety-enhancing and benefit-
transferring rules can best accomplish this goal. 
Before concluding, I’d like to address some concerns that might arise 
regarding this analysis. The first is that while we have made progress in 
terms of regulatory justice compared to the Executive Order approach, we 
may not have gone far enough. Redirecting benefits, we have said, is a 
way of making risk imposition permissible, and it is in general easier to do 
this in poor communities. This is so for a variety of reasons familiar from 
the environmental justice literature, but the diminishing marginal utility of 
money is chief among them. Each additional dollar typically does more to 
shift the expected benefits in favor of a poor person than it would to shift 
them in favor of a rich person. Since it will be easier to shift sufficient 
benefits to poor people, then we should expect that more risks will be 
imposed on them than on wealthy people. And this will only exacerbate 
injustice, for many poor people are poor because of past patterns of 
discrimination and mistreatment.  
In thinking through this charge, we should remember that, on the 
approach recommended here, when a new risk is legitimately imposed on 
those who suffer due to historical injustices, they cannot be expected to be 
worse off from it, and indeed will often be made better off. The whole 
point of the contractualist case is that those who would otherwise be likely 
to lose from an activity deserve special protection. But it must be allowed 
that the historical injustices that explain why some of the poor are poor 
have not been part of the moral analysis of risk regulation so far. As a 
result, the analysis is blind to how past injustice should effect what 
regulatory bodies should decide.  
In response, I think the contractualist should acknowledge both this 
blindness and the moral importance of historical injustices, but insist that 
this does not detract from this account of the ethics of regulating risk. They 
can do this by insisting that historical injustices generate entitlements to 
some degree of preferential treatment in the distribution of resources (or 
whatever it is that distributional justice distributes), but that these claims 
pertain to the distribution of resources overall, not to each thing that a 
government has the power to distribute. In some policy decisions, it may 
be expedient to advance the goal of corrective redistribution by privileging 
those who have historical entitlements, in other cases not. On this view, 
there is the question internal to a regulatory agency of what the 
permissible ways of conducting an activity are – this is the question that 
this paper has tried to help answer. And then there is the further question 
of whether and how the government as a whole should use its authority 
concerning the activity to further its goal of rectifying historical injustice. 
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This is a separate question: valid and morally important, but separate in 
scope and content nonetheless.20 
But what about the idea of providing people with money, goods or services 
to “offset” exposing them to what may kill them or make them sick? Isn’t 
that the kind of idea typical of the cost-benefit component of the Executive 
Order approach that we should have expected contractualism to provide 
an alternative to? The quick answer is no, it is not. Contracualism’s central 
objection to cost-benefit analysis is to the idea that harms to some could be 
morally offset by benefits (financial or otherwise) to others. The general 
idea at issue here, that harms to a person of one kind generated by an 
activity can be offset by benefits to the same person of some other kind 
generated by that activity, is shared by consequentialists, contractualists, 
and, indeed, at least implicitly by nearly everyone.  
Perhaps, though, the worry is more specific. While a person’s offsetting a 
loss in comfort with a gain in adventure makes sense, the analysis here 
seems to trade on the more specific idea that monetary payments can 
offset the badness of death. We should be careful, though, to keep in mind 
that we are really talking about risks of death considered when they are 
run. And the idea of an increased risk of death being offset by some 
financial advantage is far less controversial than the idea of ‘compensating’ 
the dead with dollars. As anyone who has driven further in order to pay a 
lower price for a product, or who has flown in order to interview for a job 
with a better salary must agree, trading safety for money is sometimes to 
one’s advantage. 
So, those who find the spirit of the precautionary principle compelling can 
find support for their intuitions in contractualism. On the interpretation I 
have defended here, this family of nonconsequentialist theories implies 
that regulators should be more cautious about permitting risky activities 
than would be the case if they were to decide using standard risk-cost-
benefit analysis. In particular, it implies that they should permit risky 
activities only when they can issue rules that increase safety or distribute 
profits in such a way that there is no one who should expect to lose from 
them. And this result is morally plausible, practically feasible and more 
precautionary than the utility-maximizing approach that currently enjoys 
such theoretical and practical prominence. 
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